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NOTES

Old Man and the Sky:
The Brazilian Antitrust Implications
for Rupert Murdoch's Expansion of
the Sky Global Satellite Network

ABSTRACT

To expand its global satellite network to the United States,
Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation purchased DirecTV in
2003. Brazil's antitrust regulatory body, CADE, has expressed
concern about a potential monopoly in the Brazilian satellite
market controlled by Murdoch because News' Sky Latin
America competes directly with DirecTV. If News opts to
combine the two Brazilian satellite services, it will consolidate
control of ninety-five percent of Brazil's satellite market, leaving
satellite and cable competitors at a disadvantage. The Author
argues that CADE should conditionally approve the acquisition
because of the combination's ability to benefit Brazilian
consumers, the government, and News Corporation itself
through lower costs, lower subscription prices, and higher
subscriptionnumbers. At the same time, because of the negative
market effects that may potentially arise from News
Corporation'smonopoly, CADE should place certain behavioral
conditions on its approval of the combination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rupert Murdoch "revolutionized the economy of sports, of
animated films, children's programming, broadcast news, and
television networks. [He] led television's trend to get down and dirty.
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And [he] has ended up in a race to win absolute control of a [global]
media empire ...." Conceived as an Australian newspaper company,
News Corporation (News), under Murdoch's leadership, "spans far
and wide, setting foot on every continent except Africa and
Antarctica." 2 With worldwide revenues totaling $12.8 billion, News
"truly owns an 'unrivaled platform' that combines unparalleled
entertainment and news media-market coverage across the globe." 3
In the United States, News owns the Twentieth Century Fox movie
studio; Fox Broadcasting, including thirty-five Fox network stations;
Fox Sports; Fox Entertainment; cable channels such as Fox News
Channel, Fox Movie Channel, and FX; as well as newspapers such as
the New York Post.4 In Asia, News owns STAR TV satellite television,
Channel [V] Music Networks, and ESPN STAR. 5 In Australia, News
owns FoxTEL, a subscription television service, Sky News Australia,
and Sky Channel. 6 In Japan, News owns eleven percent of Sky
PerfecTV! satellite television and eighty percent of News
Broadcasting Japan. 7 In Britain, News owns forty percent of British
Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB), "the world's leading satellite pay
television operator" with over 6.5 million subscribers and more than
sixteen million viewers. 8 In Latin America, News operates Sky Latin
America and cable channels Canal Fox, Fox Kids Latin America, and
Fox Sports Americas.9 Murdoch's holdings enable consumers across
the globe to gain access to television, movies, news, and sports
programming as never before.
Perhaps Murdoch's largest accomplishment in the last twelve
years has been constructing Sky Global, "a worldwide satellite empire
that began with BSkyB in Britain, stretched across Germany and
Italy through the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, Japan, covertly
in China, down through Australia and New Zealand, through South
America, and up to Mexico." 10 For the past several years Murdoch has

1.

NEIL CHENOWETH, RUPERT MURDOCH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WORLD'S

GREATEST MEDIA WIZARD xiv-xv (2001). The "trend to get down and dirty" refers to
Murdoch's participation in developing reality television, including CBS's Survivor. The
"race to win absolute control" refers to his attempts to purchase DirecTV from General
Motors in order to create a global satellite empire. See id. xvi.
2.
John T. Soma & Eric K. Weingarten, Multinational Economic Network
Effects and the Need for an InternationalAntitrust Response from the World Trade
Organization:A Case Study in Broadcast-Media and News Corporation,21 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 41, 66 (2000).

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 66-67.
See generally http://www.newscorp.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
Soma & Weingarten, supra note 2, at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 71-72.

10.

CHENOWETH, supra note 1, at 9.
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sought to fill the only hole in his network, North America, by
acquiring Hughes Electronics (Hughes) and its DirecTV satellite
service and merging it into his international network." Acquiring
DirecTV and its twelve million U.S. subscribers 12 "would give
Murdoch an unbroken world highway that could reach three-quarters
13
of the world's population."'
In May 2001, DirecTV was within Murdoch's grasp. 14 In
November, however, negotiations with General Motors, the parent
company of Hughes and DirecTV, broke down as EchoStar, the
number two satellite provider in the United States, 15 stepped in and
purchased Hughes. 16 Fortunately for Murdoch, the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) blocked EchoStar's purchase of Hughes on antitrust
grounds, 17 creating an environment in which Murdoch could finally
purchase the last piece of his satellite puzzle.
On April 9, 2003, News purchased a thirty-four percent interest
in Hughes from General Motors for $6.6 billion.' 8 By the end of 2003,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the DOJ had
conditionally approved News' acquisition of Hughes, ignoring fears
that News "would raise its programming prices to cable rivals, such
as Comcast Corp., or threaten to pull Fox programming in order to
drive customers away from cable and to DirecTV." 19 In approving the
merger, the FCC cited News' history of adding channels and features,
such as interactivity, to its other satellite systems, which would
create a "more muscular competitor to the cable industry, which has
monopolies in most markets. ' 20 As a condition of the acquisition, the
FCC required News to "beam local channels into 100 of the nation's
markets by the end of [2004] and to provide local service to the rest of

11.
Id.
12.
Murdoch Expects DirecTV Nod, CNN.cOM, Oct. 15, 2003, available at
LEXIS, News Library, CNNC File.
13.
CHENOWETH, supranote 1, at 9.
14.
Id. at 10.
15.
Murdoch Expects DirecTV Nod, supra note 12 (EchoStar has eight million
U.S. subscribers.).
16.
CHENOWETH, supra note 1, at 26, 29. News had offered General Motors $22
to $23 billion in stock, with $3 billion in cash. General Motors took EchoStar's offer of
stock worth $28.5 billion and $4.2 billion in cash.

17.

Anne C. Mulkern, Decision Hard on the Heels of EchoStar-DirecTV Veto,

DENVER POST, Nov. 14, 2002, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The Denver Post File.
The rationale behind the Department of Justice's decision is discussed infra, Part W.A.

18.

Tony Smith, In Brazil, Weak Market Gives Merger Better Chance, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.

19.

Frank

Ahrens,

FCC Approves

Murdoch

Purchase of DirecTV,

TECHNEWS.coM, Dec. 19, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
20.
Id.
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the country's 210 markets no later than 2008" in order to comply with
21
the agency's goal of localism.
Although the acquisition received approval from U.S. regulators,
hurdles must be overcome in Brazil, where antitrust watchdog
Conselho Administrativo de Defensa Economica (CADE) and the
National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL) will review the
acquisition. 22 With the combination of parent companies News and
Hughes, Brazilian regulators worry that in Latin America, the only
region where News and Hughes compete directly,23 a combination of
News' Sky Latin America (Sky) and Hughes' DirecTV Latin America
(DirecTV) will follow. 24 Although News' purchase of Hughes did not
explicitly provide for the fusion of Sky and DirecTV in Brazil, News
stated that "[a]ny opportunities to improve operational efficiencies
and reduce costs associated with the Latin American operations will
be considered by the management and board of [Hughes] after the
completion of the transaction .... -25 Additionally, a U.S. Bankruptcy
Court's recent approval of DirecTV's reorganization brought News
"one step closer to cleaning up and merging its two Latin American
digital broadcast satellite platforms" by providing for News, through
its control of Hughes, to increase its stake in DirecTV from seventy to
eighty percent. 26 The companies' competitor, Tecsat, as well as
Brazilian media analysts are "taking a regional merger for
granted. '2 7 Paulo Hisse de Castro, director for new business at
Tecsat, said "[i]f... Murdoch buys DirecTV, he will certainly merge
the operator with Sky to cut costs." 28 Tecsat officials testified before
the FCC, to no avail, that approving the acquisition in the United
States would provide for "de facto control to be exercised by News
Corp. over Hughes and its subsidiaries [allowing] these 2 competitors
in Brazil to act in concert to further [hurt] Tecsat in the [direct-to-

21.
Id.
22.
See How DirecTV Fits into News Corporation'sMedia Empire, ECONOMIST,
July 10, 2004, at 54; News Corp Buy of Hughes/DirecTV Would Face Regulatory Probe
in Brazil-CADE, AFX EUR. FOCUS, Apr. 4, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library,
AFXEF File [hereinafter Regulatory Probe]; Smith, supranote 18.
23.
Mary Sutter, Fox Sports Drops Out of Sky, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 26, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News Library, DLYVTY File.
24.
Id.
25.
DirecTV Latin America's Operations Not Affected by Split-Off of Hughes
Electronics Corporationfrom GM, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 9, 2003, available at LEXIS,
News Library, PR NEWS File [hereinafter OperationsNot Affected].
26.
Mary Sutter, Sat Plan Takes Wing: Reorg. of DirecTV Latin America Flies
with Court, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 16, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library.
27.
Smith, supra note 18.
28.
Regulatory Probe,supra note 22.
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home] market by restricting access to programs. '29 In May 2004,
30
CADE issued a preliminary ruling concerning the combination.
A combination of Sky and DirecTV would give News control of
ninety-five percent of the Brazilian satellite market, leaving Tecsat, a
domestic operator with 50,000 subscribers, just five percent. 3 1 In a
country with ten million satellite dishes already installed, 32 an
enormous potential market exists for a combined Sky-DirecTV
satellite television format. Sky formed in 1995 as an alliance between
four mass media companies: News Corporation; Televisa Group, "a
Mexican company recognized as a leading producer of television
programming for Latin America"; Organization Globo, "which has
interests in television production and cable programming; and
Liberty Media, a leading U.S. cable television company. '33 At the
time of the News-Hughes deal, Sky provided satellite-based digital
television service to 730,000 subscribers in Brazil, 34 a 19.7 percent
share of the market. 35 DirecTV is the "leading pay television service
in Latin America and the Caribbean with approximately 1.6 million
subscribers in 28 countries. '36 In Brazil, DirecTV has 500,000
subscribers, 3 7 an 11.3 percent share of the market. 38 Cutting costs
may be particularly important to the long term success of both
companies because of the financial hardships both suffered last year.
In 2002, Sky lost $386 million, and in March 2003, DirecTV "filed for
bankruptcy ...protection after a loss of $202 million in Brazil the
39
previous year."

29.
News Corp.-Hughes Still Waiting on Decision from FCC, SATELLITE WEEK,
Dec. 22, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, SATWK File (second alteration in
original).
30.
See Unite and Lehman in Student Venture, EVENING STANDARD, Apr. 15,
2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, ESTAND File ("CADE is placing conditions
on News Corp.'s acquisition of US DirecTV, which operates in the country, to ensure
fairness in the market while it studies the deal. The regulator said the companies
agreed that News Corp. would not discriminate against rival operators in programme
[sic] sales.").
31.
Regulatory Probe, supra note 22.
32.
Smith, supra note 18. To this point the 10 million satellite dishes in Brazil
have been used to improve the reception of the channels of the country's seven
broadcasters (free television).
33.
Sky Expands Use of Infonet's Network Services in Colombia and Chile;
Media Giant Selects High Performance Services to Support Satellite Service Delivery,
BUS. WIRE, July 15, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File.
34.
Regulatory Probe,supra note 22.
35.
DirecTV Latin America Says it Expects to Break Even by 2005, SATELLITE
WK., Dec. 22, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, SATWK File [hereinafter Break
Even].
36.
OperationsNot Affected, supra note 25.
37.
Regulatory Probe,supra note 22.
38.
Break Even, supra note 35.
39.
Smith, supra note 18.
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Although regulators worry that giving Murdoch "a near
unassailable lead across a region where people watch a lot of
television" would be damaging to the Brazilian consumers, 40 other
analysts point to News' uncanny ability to improve satellite
television, thereby providing more programming options to the
developing world. 41 This Note will analyze whether a combination
between Sky and DirecTV would be detrimental to Brazilian
consumers and how Brazilian antitrust regulators should respond to
the combination. Part II of this Note will explore Brazil's antitrust
regime in the context of the country's economic progress from a
command-and-control to a free-market system. Part III will examine
the past mergers and acquisitions in Brazil involving international
corporations and the illogical outcomes of CADE's reviews. Part IV
will examine past antitrust actions in the satellite industry and
recommend that in light of antitrust principles and Brazil's economic
goals, CADE should conditionally approve the combination but
employ certain targeted behavioral conditions on News to promote
the interests of the Brazilian satellite consumer.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZIL'S ANTITRUST REGIME

Between 1964 and 1985, a military dictatorship ruled Brazil,
adopting an economic policy of economy-wide price controls,
investment in parastatal corporations in key industries, and import
substitution. 42 During the period, CADE, established in 1962 as
Brazil's antitrust watchdog agency, had very little effect on the
economy or responsibility for ensuring a competitive business
climate. 4 3 CADE originally "was nominally an antitrust agency, but
had been best known for ordering firms to roll back excessive price
increases.' 44 There was little need during this period for a
governmental agency to ensure competition when the government
itself owned many of the nation's industries. These economic polices
"combined with a sharp increase in oil prices and interest rates
during the early 1980s, led to a catastrophic debt crisis, which forced
Brazil to miss interest payments on loans to foreign banks. '45 By the

40.
Id.
41.
Ahrens, supra note 19.
42.
William H. Page, Antitrust Review of Mergers in Transition Economies: A
Comment, with Some Lessons from Brazil, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1998).
43.
Gesner Oliveira, Antitrust Policy in Brazil: Recent Trends and Challenges
Ahead, 4 USIA ECON. PERSP. 1 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/
journals/ites/0299/ijee/brazil.htm.
44.
Page, supra note 42, at 1120.
45.
Id. at 1119.
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end of the 1980s, "Brazil faced inflation rates of up to 3000% per
46
year."
Brazil's government changed its course during the 1990s with
the adoption of the New Brazil Plan, which "introduced numerous
market-based
reforms,
including
gradual
privatization
of
government-owned industries, deregulation, removal of restrictions
on foreign direct investment, and the reduction of tariffs and export
subsidies. '47 In 1991, Brazil entered into the Mercosur Agreement
with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay that created a free-trade
zone in South America.48 These reforms helped reduce inflation rates,
49
increase economic activity, and increase foreign direct investment.
As free markets expanded, the Brazilian government formulated a
new competition policy, which for the satellite industry involved two
regulatory bodies: Conselho Administrativo de Defensa Economica
50
and the National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL).
A. Conselho Administrativo De Defensa Economica (CADE)
As free-market reforms continued, the Brazilian government
began to develop its competition policy to respond to the "social
demand for the repression and prevention of the abuse of economic
power, now more concentrated in the hands of private agents. ' 51 In
1994, the government enacted Law No. 8.884, the statute that created
Brazil's modern antitrust regime. 52 The statute consolidated existing
statutes and strengthened enforcement through the creation of three
agencies: CADE, "the agency responsible for monitoring and curbing
potential abuses of economic power" and autonomous under the
Ministry of Justice; the Secretaria de Acompanhamento Economico
(SEAE), a department under the Ministry of Economy that reviews
cases from an economic standpoint; and the Secretaria de Direito
Economico (SDE), a "department under the Ministry of Justice ...
'53
[that] reviews the acts and transactions from a legal standpoint.
Ultimately, CADE is "responsible for the final judgment on whether
violations have occurred and for the consequent imposition of
54
sanctions, if applicable.,

46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 1119-20.
48.
Id. at 1120.
49.
Id.
50.
Oliveira, supra note 43.
51.
Id.
52.
Page, supra note 42, at 1120.
53.
William M. Hannay, Transnational Competition Law Aspects of Mergers
and Acquisitions, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 287, 299 (2000).
54.
Id.
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The 1994 law requires that "any transaction involving 20 percent
or more of the relevant market or where any party to the transaction
has posted gross revenues in the latest year exceeding 400 million
'56
Reais [$111 million] 55 must be submitted to CADE for review.
Additionally, CADE may review any merger that involves firms
outside of Brazil if it effects competition and economic conditions
inside Brazil. 57 CADE reviews the merger for "violations of the
economic order[,]" defined as "acts that have (or are intended to have)
defined negative'5effects,
including limiting competition and abusing
'market control.' 8 A transaction involving a degree of market control
is permissible "if parties can demonstrate: that there will be
productivity gains, that the benefits will be distributed evenly among
consumers and producers . . ., that competition will not be reduced
substantially in the relevant market,"59 and that efficiency will be
enhanced. 60 There is "no market share ceiling above which CADE
won't approve a deal," but the greater the concentration, the more
'61
likely CADE is to "impose conditions on its approval of the deal.'
Unlike its 1962 predecessor, CADE is now "relatively
autonomous" and free from political influence.6 2 Similar to the
situation in the United States, courts give deference to regulatory
bodies like CADE, overturning regulatory decisions only on
procedural or constitutional grounds. 63 In addition, CADE's members
are not subject to direct political control, and the 1994 statute
requires CADE's members to be competition-law experts capable of
assisting Brazil's economic transition.6 4 In 1998, three commissioners
had doctorates in economics or finance, two held doctoral degrees in
law and had written dissertations on topics involving competition
policy, and one held the LL.M. degree from Harvard.6 5 Upon visiting
CADE in 1998, William Kovacic, a professor of antitrust law at The
George Washington University Law School, was impressed with how
"each of the CADE commissioners revealed a sophisticated
understanding of both the technical details and broader policy

55.
Michael Kepp, Brazil's Regulator May OKAirline Merger, DAILY DEAL, Feb.
8, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, DADEAL File.
56.
Hannay, supra note 53, at 300.
57.
Page, supra note 42, at 1123.
58.
Id. at 1121 (quoting Law No. 8.884, of June 11, 1994, art. 20, amended by
Law No. 9.069, of June 29, 1995, available at http://www.cade.gov.br).
59.
Hannay, supra note 53, at 300.
60.
Page, supra note 42, at 1123.
61.
Kepp, supra note 55.
62.
Page, supra note 42, at 1121.
63.

Id.

64.
Id.
65.
William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition
Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 361, 369 (2000).
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considerations of competition policy analysis. ' 66 During his visit,
Kovacic witnessed a public meeting on a merger in which
[a]ll six CADE members participated in a free-wheeling discussion of the
transaction. They addressed previous CADE merger decisions and examined
the transaction in light of current developments in doctrine and policy in the
[European Union] and the United States. The members debated fine points of
the EU and United States merger guidelines, judicial decisions, and the recent
67
academic literature from economic and legal commentators.

The knowledge of CADE's members demonstrates that Brazil does
indeed have an active competition-law regime, relatively vigorous
compared to its Latin American counterparts. 68 CADE's members
take their role in the country's development seriously and seem to
consider themselves essential to the government's plan for future
investment and development.
B. National TelecommunicationsAgency (ANATEL)
The 1997 General Telecommunications Act created ANATEL,
charged with the objective "to create investment opportunities, and to
foster technological and industrial development in a competitive
environment. '6 9 In receiving "legal authority to control, prevent and
curb any breach of the economic order in the telecommunications
industry, without prejudice to the powers vested in [CADE],"
ANATEL's jurisdiction overlaps with that of CADE. 70 Brazil's
antitrust regime rectifies this overlap by giving CADE the
responsibility
for
market
structure
control
of
private
telecommunications operators, while ANATEL is responsible for
71
preparing legal opinions.

66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Hannay, supra note 53.
69.
Gesner Oliveira & Caio MArio da Silva Pereira Neto, Second Annual Latin
American Competition and Trade Round Table: Regulation and Competition Policy:
Towards an Optimal Institutional Configuration in the Brazilian Telecommunications
Industry, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 311, 328 (1999) (quoting Decreto No. 9472, de 16 de
julho de 1997, Lex de 8.01.1997, art. 2(V) (General Telecommunications Act)).
70.
Id. (quoting Decreto No. 9472, de 16 de julho de 1997, Lex de 8.01.1997, art.
19(XIX) (General Telecommunications Act)).
71.
Id. at 331.
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III. THE BRAZILIAN ANTITRUST EXPERIENCE: CADE SHOWING ITS
TEETH
Since the establishment of Brazil's modern regulatory framework
in 1994, CADE has attempted to serve as an active watchdog,
ensuring a competitive marketplace while simultaneously creating an
72
environment attractive to foreign investors. The decentralization of
the Brazilian economy during the 1990s caused many international
corporations to desire to enter the Brazilian market in order to bring
73
Four such
their goods to millions of additional consumers.
Brewing
Miller
corporations-Colgate-Palmolive,
international
the
to
enter
Nestle-attempted
and
Company, Anheuser-Busch,
Brazilian marketplace in the last two decades to capitalize on the
burgeoning Brazilian market. 74 In the late 1990s, CADE conditionally
approved Colgate-Palmolive's buyout of the South American
toothpaste company Kolynos, 75 Miller Brewing Company's acquisition
of the Brazilian brewer Cervejaria Brahma, and Anheuser-Busch's
purchase of Brazilian brewer Antarctica. 76 Each acquisition involved
entering into and consolidating
large overseas corporations
production within the Brazilian marketplace, much as News is
attempting to do by combining Sky Latin America with DirecTV
Latin America. Examining CADE's responses to these acquisitions is
helpful in determining how CADE should act with regard to Rupert
Murdoch's attempt to bring sophisticated satellite television to Brazil.
Much can also be learned from CADE's flat rejection in February
2003 of Swiss food-giant Nestle SA's proposed acquisition of Brazil's
77
Chocolates Garoto.

72.
See Geoff Dyer, Competition Watchdog Shows its Teeth: The Present
Government has Encouraged an Assertive Competitions Policy, FIN. TIMES, July 23,
1997, availableat LEXIS, News Library ("Brazil has become one of the most attractive
locations in the world for direct investment as a result of the transformation of its
economy since the launch of a new currency three years ago. These investment flows
are doubly important for the economy, for as well as helping finance the expanding
current account deficit, which is expected to exceed 4 percent of GDP this year, they
also cut dependence on more fickle short-term capital to make up the shortfall.").
See id.
73.
74.
See A.E. Rodriguez & M.B. Coate, Merger Pitfalls in Practice: Three Case
Studies, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 793, 812 (1999) (discussion of the Miller and
Anheuser-Busch acquisitions); Dyer, supra note 72 (discussion of the Colgate
acquisition); Andrea Welsh, Brazil's Antitrust Body Grows Bolder, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25,
2004, at B6A (discussion of the Nestle acquisition).
Dyer, supra note 72.
75.
76.
Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 74, at 813.

77.

Walsh, supranote 73, at B6A.
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A. The Toothpaste Decision:Leaving a Monetary Cavity in the Pockets
of Brazilian Consumers
In 1995, Colgate-Palmolive (Colgate) acquired American Home
Products (AHP), and in doing so, AHP's Brazilian subsidiary Kolynos,
a leading producer of toothpaste and other oral care products.78 In its
first great undertaking as a regulatory body, CADE engaged in an
extensive review of the proposed acquisition for possible negative
effects on competition in Brazil. 79 CADE focused its attention on the
relevant market and the existing barriers to entry in determining its
course of action.8 0
CADE sought to determine the degree of market power a
Colgate-Kolynos combination would have.81 Colgate argued that a
single "oral hygiene" market existed in which toothpaste,
toothbrushes, dental floss, and mouthwash would constitute one
market with four sub-markets.8 2 Under this approach, a ColgateKolynos combination would result in a new company "of relatively
little importance for antitrust law, with its capacity to impede or
restrict competition equally limited.18 3 CADE, however, rejected
Colgate's argument, opting instead to regard each sub-market as a
distinct market.8 4 Of particular concern to CADE was the fact that
the newly merged Coglate-Kolynos group would account for eighty
percent of the Brazilian toothpaste market.8 5 Furthermore, "CADE
defined the relevant geographic market . . . as the national market,
given that all of the companies established in the country distribute
their products nationally and that the commercial opening of the
market has not yet generated a great volume of imports. 8 6 Given this
definition of the relevant market, CADE was concerned with the level
of market concentration, with Colgate having an eighty percent
87
share.
At the same time, however, CADE concluded that the barriers to
entry in the toothpaste market were quite low, thereby allowing
competitors to enter the market in the future which would keep

78.
Page, supra note 42, at 1124.
79.
See id. at 1124-25.
80.
Page, supra note 42, at 1125; "Relevant Market" is Key to Understanding
Recent Decisions by Brazil'sAnti-Monopoly Agency, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., Nov. 30,
1997, at 9 [hereinafter Relevant Market].
81.
Relevant Market, supra note 80.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Dyer, supra note 72.
86.
Relevant Market, supra note 80.
87.
Id.
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Colgate's prices at reasonable levels.88 CADE found product
differentiation and strong consumer loyalty to be the only substantial
barriers to entry in the toothpaste market.8 9 Although heavy
investment in advertising and the establishment of a large-scale
distribution network would be necessary to compete in this market,
CADE concluded that these barriers were not significant. 90 Since the
barriers to entry were quite low, it would be difficult for Colgate to
charge above the competitive price, even if it possessed a large share
of the toothpaste market because if Colgate charged prices
significantly greater than the market price, a new toothpaste
company could easily enter the market and sell at lower prices. 91
Despite concluding that the combination would have little
negative effect on the marketplace because of the minimal barriers to
entry, CADE only conditionally approved the proposed ColgateKolynos combination. 92 CADE conditioned its approval of the
acquisition on Colgate's adoption of one of three measures:
"suspend[ing] Colgate's use of the Kolynos trademark in Brazil for
four years, licens[ing] the Kolynos trademark to another firm for
twenty years, or sell[ing] the trademark to a competitor with a small
market share. ' 93 Colgate chose the first measure to give competitors a
chance to establish themselves; it also decided to sell toothpaste in
Brazil temporarily under a new brand, "Sorriso," and to sell twenty
percent of its stock of toothpaste to third parties for resale under
94
their brands.
Analysts have criticized CADE's actions for leaving Colgate's
eighty percent market share intact, while preventing the company
from ever maintaining that share "by forcing it to forfeit the goodwill
associated with the Kolynos mark."95 While CADE "has the apparent
goal . . . of encouraging new entry or expansion of production by
fringe producers . . . it does so by imposing huge additional costs on
Colgate. '9 6 This does little to help consumers who "will be required to
97
incur additional search costs in order to find the brand they prefer."
In the end, CADE's remedy "attempts to deconcentrate the market by
impeding the productivity of the leading firm and confusing
consumers, not by restoring competition."98 Such inconsistent and

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Page, supra note 42, at 1125.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Dyer, supranote 72.
Page, supra note 42, at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inappropriate remedies may not only stunt foreign capital investment
entering Brazil99 but will also likely hurt Brazilian consumers by
impeding their access to the best goods and services available. 10 0
B. The Beer Decisions: Leaving a Bitter Taste in the Mouths of Foreign
Investors
In 1995, Miller and Anheuser-Busch attempted to strengthen
their respective positions in the Brazilian beer market by entering
into separate joint ventures with large Brazilian brewers. 10 1 CADE's
initial rejection of the two proposed combinations followed by its
eventual backtrack into conditionally approving both ventures
demonstrated CADE's attempt to protect Brazilian corporations from
foreign competition by "showing its teeth," 10 2 rather than by simply
preserving a competitive atmosphere.10 3 In one agreement, Miller,
the world's third largest beer brewer, and Brazilian Cervejaria
Brahma, the world's fifth largest beer brewer, entered into an
agreement to produce Miller Genuine Draft beer in Brazil. 10 4 In the
other agreement, Anheuser-Busch, the world's largest beer brewer,
agreed to purchase five percent of Antarctica, Brazil's second largest
beer brewer, with an option to purchase thirty percent. 10 5 Before
these agreements, three large suppliers competed in Brazil's beer
market: Brahma, with forty-seven percent of the national market;
Antarctica, with twenty-six percent; and Kaiser (backed by Coca
Cola), 10 6 with seventeen percent. In contrast, Miller Genuine Draft
and Anheuser-Busch during this time controlled only a negligible
share of the market during this time. 10 7 The competitive nature of the
market, combined with the fact that Miller and Anheuser controlled
only 0.2 percent of the market, led both industry analysts and
executives of the American beer giants to conclude that penetration of
the Brazilian market would have been nearly impossible for both
10 8
brewers without the help of a local partner.

99.
See Jonathan Wheatley, Miller Ordered to End Brazilian Joint Venture,
FIN. TIMES, June 13, 1997, available at LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Wheatley,
Joint Venture].
100.
Page, supra note 42, at 1126.
101.
Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 74, at 812.
102.
Dyer, supra note 72.
103.
See Wheatley, Joint Venture, supra note 99.
104.
Is Brazil Antitrust--or Anti-Foreigner?, Bus. WK. (international edition),
July 21, 1997, available at LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Brazil Antitrust].
105.
Rodriquez & Coate, supra note 74, at 812.
106.
Shankar A. Singham, Shaping Competition Policy in the Americas: Scope
for TransatlanticCooperation?,24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 381 (1998).
107.
Id.
108.
Brazil Antitrust, supra note 104.
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CADE reviewed and initially blocked both agreements because
each proposed acquisition would reduce potential competition.' 0 9
These agreements promised "the usual benefits of foreign direct
investment: modernized capital stock, knowhow, jobs, and increased
exports (in this case, Brazilian beer)." 110 But CADE worried about the
possible effect of reduced potential competition on the Brazilian
marketplace."' The concept of potential competition
borrowed from American antitrust law, is that a firm that is not
already in a market nevertheless competitively influences an
oligopolistic market by the threat of entry. If a potential entrant were
to acquire a leading firm in the market, the acquisition might then
reduce competition by eliminating the perceived threat of entry and
112
thus allowing existing firms to raise prices.

CADE believed that Anheuser-Busch and Miller were potential
entrants because of their respective "economic size, greater efficiency,
position in the world market, and principally, business expansion
strategy [to target] the main emerging economies for entry." 113 Under
the potential competition theory, the threat of entry by Miller and
Anheuser-Busch into the Brazilian market prevented Brazilian
brewers from raising prices for fear that they could be undercut by
the new entrants. Miller and Anheuser-Busch's entry into the
Brazilian market as partners with domestic brewers, however, would
subsequently reduce competition, thereby lessening the likelihood of
continued low prices. Specifically, CADE worried that less
competition would result in an increase in the price of beer, which
would function like a regressive tax on Brazilian consumers. 114 CADE
therefore ordered that both ventures be dissolved 15 because it
believed that they would serve to "crystallize[] the shared dominant
position between Brahma and Antarctica."" 6
CADE'S decision to forbid the proposed ventures represented a
remarkable show of strength by the Brazilian regulator, sending a
message to the foreign business community that doing business in
Brazil would be difficult and that one should not take merger
approval for granted. Less than a year later, however, CADE came to
an agreement with both Miller and Anheuser-Busch to conditionally

109.
Page, supra note 42, at 1127.
110.
Russell W. Pittman, Second Annual Latin American Competition and
Trade Round Table: Introduction,25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 263, 266 (1999).
111.
Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 74, at 813.
112.
Page, supranote 42, at 1127.
113.
Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 74, at 813.
114.
Pittman, supra note 110.
115.
Wheatley, Joint Venture, supra note 99.
116.
Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 74, at 813.
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approve the mergers. 117 CADE conditioned the Miller-Brahma deal
upon Brahma's contracting to provide bottling facilities to one small
Brazilian brewer and technical assistance to three microbreweries. 118 CADE ordered Anheuser-Busch to raise its stake in
Antarctica from five percent to 29.7 percent by 2002, at a cost of $467
million, which constituted part of a five-year investment of about $1
billion. 119
The way in which CADE dissolved the agreements and then
reversed its decision by granting conditional approval has been
criticized vehemently by competition experts as an indication that,
because of CADE's difficulty in determining its proper role in the new
Brazilian economy, doing business in Brazil is potentially costly and
dangerous. 12 0 In particular, CADE's reliance on the potential
competition theory seemed misplaced because even with the entry of
Miller and Anheuser-Busch into the Brazilian market, substantial
competition still existed.
While Brahma had 46.6 percent of the market and Antarctica 31.9
percent in 1995, those shares had declined from 50.3 percent and 40.8
percent, respectively, in 1989. During that time, the third leading
brewer increased its share from 7.9 percent to 14.6 percent, while the
fourth leading brewer increased its share from 0.2 percent to 5.4
percent. 121

These statistics indicate that substantial competition exists in the
Brazilian beer market. Thus, entry by Miller and Anheuser-Busch
would not result in a price increase. Rather than protecting
consumers, CADE, by commanding Anheuser-Busch to invest more
122
money in Brazil, essentially enacted a "toll to enter Brazil."'
Furthermore, the potential competition theory only applies if the
acquiring firm is one of only a few likely entrants. 123 Here, "there was
little reason to think that Anheuser or Miller had a special advantage
over other firms as a potential entrant. CADE noted that the second,
third, and seventh leading world brewers had formed alliances with
domestic brewers. Seemingly, the fourth, fifth, and sixth leading
brewers in the world would also be capable of entry."'1 4 As such,
entry of Anheuser-Busch, even though the largest brewer in the

Jonathan Wheatley, Miller's Brazil Venture Approved, FIN. TIMES, May 15,
117.
1998, availableat LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Wheatley, Venture Approved].
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
See Brazil Antitrust, supra note 104 (Gesner Oliveira, President of CADE,
and a dissenter in the Miller-Brahma vote, said he saw "signs of xenophobia" among
CADE members.).
121.
Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 74, at 814.
122.
Wheatley, Venture Approved, supra note 117.
123.
Id.
124.
Wheatley, Joint Venture, supranote 99.
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world, would not preclude other entrants into the Brazilian market,
and therefore would not reduce potential competition from other
world-wide brewers. 125 Despite having one of the most attractive
locations in the world for direct investment, CADE's action, which
ignored basic antitrust principles by benefiting neither consumers nor
businesses, "could cause problems for some prospective joint
126
ventures" in the future.
C. The Chocolate Decision:Not So Sweet for InternationalMergers
In March 2002, Swiss food giant Nestle SA (Nestle) proposed to
purchase Brazil's Chocolates Garoto (Garoto) to expand its position in
128
12 7
The $442 million acquisition
the Brazilian chocolate market.
would have yielded Nestle a fifty-four percent share of Brazil's
129
market in chocolate sweets, chocolate bars, and candy bars.
Cadbury, a chocolate company that had offered $400 million for
Garoto only to be out-bid by Nestle, immediately lobbied CADE to
reject the acquisition on antitrust grounds. 130 According to Cadbury,
"Nestle's management in Switzerland told its Brazilian unit to do all
it could to buy Garoto and prevent the entry of a new competitor in
the Brazilian market [i.e., Cadbury].''
CADE flatly rejected Nestle's proposed acquisition in March
2004, "completely reversing a transaction for the first time in its 40year history.' 13 2 Although CADE may in coming months bow to
political pressure from supporters of the acquisition (as it did in the
"beer decisions") and reverse its ruling by conditionally approving the
acquisition, such a move appears unlikely given the six to one vote by
the CADE board rejecting the combination.' 3 3 Using a pricing model
based on one used by the U.S. Department of Justice, CADE saw
post-combination prices "rising by more than twenty-one percent for
blocks of chocolate, nearly seventeen percent for boxes of candies and
almost thirty-two percent for solid confectioners' chocolate. In liquid
confectioners' chocolates, the merged company would have a

125.
Id.
126.
Dyer, supra note 72.
127.
Kepp, supra note 55.
128.
Id.
129.
Cadbury Asks Brazil Antitrust to Block Nestle Buy of Garoto, AFX.COM,
Mar. 22, 2002, availableat LEXIS, News Library.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Welsh, supranote 74.
133.
Id.

1164

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONA L LA W

[VOL. 37:1147

monopoly allowing it to raise prices at will.' l3 4 Although CADE took
13 5
two years to act, it has been applauded for its efforts.
CADE's action in the chocolate decision, however, has made
some investors even warier about mergers and acquisition in
Brazil.136 The stock of Brazil's biggest grocer fell six percent when
CADE moved in December 2003 to review a joint venture forged with
the family-run Sendas chain. 137 As CADE moves closer to becoming a
more robust antitrust watchdog, analysts are continuing to watch for
138
negative effects on foreign direct investment.

IV. BRAZILIAN

ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

NEWS-HUGHES

COMBINATION

In its application of antitrust principles, Brazil has tried to
adhere to a model similar to that of the United States and European
Union (EU) in which regulators do not consider monopolies to be
inherently detrimental to economic efficiency.' 3 9 U.S. regulators once
viewed monopolistic behavior as inherently harmful because
monopolists always seek to extract monopoly rents from
consumers. 140 Now, however, U.S. regulators assess both a merger's
effect on competition in the market and its effect on prices when
determining whether to approve or reject a merger. 141 The same can
be said of EU regulators who are "more concerned with the actual
anticompetitive conduct of firms with a dominant position in the
market.' 1 42 Similar to U.S. and EU regulators, regulators in Brazil
and other developing Latin American countries have tried to "follow a
model whereby certain exceptions [to forbidding monopolies] are
authorized for practices that help enhance economic efficiency with
143
respect both to market participants and consumers."
Given Brazil's practice of accepting monopolistic concentrations
where such ventures benefit market participants and consumers,

134 Tony Smith, Bittersweet Decision for Brazil: Nestle Purchase of Chocolate Maker
Tests Antitrust Policy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 4, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
Library.
135 Welsh, supra note 74.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139.
See Singham, supra note 106, at 393 (arguing that Brazil looks to the
effects of market concentration on market participants and consumers in assessing
potential combinations, rather than simply rejecting any monopolistic combination).
Singham, supra note 106, at 367-68.
140.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. at 368.
143.
Id. at 393.
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CADE should not reject the combination of Sky Latin America and
DirecTV Latin America. The U.S. and European experiences have
demonstrated that under some circumstances a monopolistic
environment that creates greater economic efficiency is possible in a
particular market. 144 In determining how CADE should act in
response to this particular combination, it is first necessary to look at
the U.S.'s recent concern about concentration in the satellite market
as evidenced by its rejection of EchoStar's proposed acquisition of
DirecTV in 2000. Second, the recently accepted combination of News
and Hughes in the United States will also be examined. Finally, an
application of antitrust principles to the News-Hughes combination in
Brazil with an emphasis on Brazil's economic goals demonstrates that
CADE should conditionally approve the acquisition, employing
certain targeted conditions on News' marketplace behavior to ensure
the best experience for the Brazilian satellite consumer.
A. The U.S. 's Rejection of the EchoStar-HughesCombination
In 2001, U.S. antitrust regulators rejected a proposal by
EchoStar, the owner of Dish Network, and the number two satellite
provider in the United States, 145 to purchase Hughes' DirecTV,
America's number one satellite provider. 146 The FCC and the DOJ
rejected the proposal amidst concerns that the merger would have
resulted in only one satellite provider in the United States and as
such "consumers in rural areas who could not get cable would only
have one option for [pay] television service. ' 147 Even in those markets
with cable service, the merger would have reduced consumers' choices
from three-cable, Dish Network, and DirecTV-to just two. 148 The
U.S. regulators' decision reflected traditional antitrust concerns that
a lack of competition creates an environment conducive to price
increases, which in turn harms consumers. Perhaps the biggest
influence in quashing the proposed merger was Rupert Murdoch, who
149
vehemently lobbied lawmakers to nullify the deal.
Whether rejecting the proposal served the consumers' best
interests was hotly debated. The merger would have enabled
EchoStar and DirecTV to "combine their satellite fleets and save

144.

Id.

145.

Murdoch Expects DirecTVNod, supra note 12.

146.

Id.

147.
Mulkern, supra note 17.
148.
Jennifer Beauprez & Kris Hudson, Monopoly Concern Tarnish EchoStar
Deal, DENVER POST, Nov. 4, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library.
149.
Mulkern, supra note 17 (Murdoch's opposition of the merger stemmed from
the fact that EchoStar had beaten him out for DirecTV. Murdoch's lobbying strategy
proved fruitful, for the rejection of the merger reopened the door for him once again to
try to purchase DirecTV, which this time proved successful.).
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millions by beaming down one signal instead of two. Those savings
... would be passed on to consumers." 150 In addition, because the
satellite industry survives on subscriptions, the combined satellite
company would resist enacting an across-the-board price increase in
those markets served by cable providers because such a move would
result in losing subscribers. Finally, a combined satellite service
would have an improved "capacity to beam local channels into more
markets than they do separately," which would quell the FCC's
concern that market concentration results in fewer programming
options for consumers.1 51
B. The U.S.'s Approval of the News-Hughes Combination
On December 19, 2003, the FCC conditionally approved News'
acquisition of Hughes and its subsidiary DirecTV. 152 The FCC
recognized that the combination
would benefit American
consumers. 153 Despite the fear that the acquisition would result in
News "rais[ing] its programming prices to cable rivals, such as
Comcast Corp., or threaten[ing] to pull Fox programming in order to
drive customers away from cable and to DirecTV,' 54 U.S. regulators
realized that consumers would still benefit from "News's ... [practice]

of adding channels and features, such as interactivity, to its other
satellite systems, which would create a more muscular competitor to
the cable industry, which has monopolies in most markets. 1 55
U.S. antitrust regulators, however, did not approve the merger
without first placing certain conditions on News.' 5 6 First, the FCC
required News to "beam local channels into 100 of the nation's
markets by the end of [2004] and to provide local service to the rest of
the country's 210 markets no later than 2008" in order to comply with
the agency's goal of localism. 157 Second, News agreed to the FCC's
demand that it offer its cable channels, such as Fox Sports Net, Fox
Movie Channel, and Fox News Channel to cable providers at the
same price that it offers them to DirecTV. 158 Third, the approval
called for arbitration in programming disputes between cable and
satellite providers as an alternative to service interruptions and
private negotiations that may contribute to price increases for the

150.
Beauprez & Hudson, supra note 148.
151.
Id.
152.
News-Hughes Merger: FCC,DOJ OK News-Hughes Merger, CABLEFAX, Dec.
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consumer. 159 The FCC, supported by America's largest cable
companies, hoped that such requirements will allow News to provide
consumers with the best service possible while not resulting in price
16 0
increases or preventing its competitors from airing Fox channels.
C. Recommendations for CADE's FinalRuling: Conditioning
Approval of the News-Hughes Brazilian Venture on News'Adherence
to BehavioralRequirements
CADE's past adventures in antitrust regulation demonstrate a
failure to follow the prevalent worldwide model. 16 1 In the "toothpaste
decisions," CADE conditionally approved a monopolistic combination,
but did so by imposing conditions that raised costs to both consumers
and the companies involved. 162 Likewise, in the "beer decisions,"
CADE was influenced by the "potential competition" doctrine 163 and
imposed conditions on brewers that functioned more like "tolls"
required to enter the Brazilian market than structural or behavioral
conditions that would enhance economic efficiency.' 6 4 In the
"chocolate decision," CADE rejected the acquisition because of a fear
of price increases. 165 With respect to the News-Hughes venture,
CADE should not flatly reject the proposed combination on the
ground that a monopolistic concentration will result. Rather, CADE
must follow the prevalent worldwide model of antitrust regulation as
used by U.S. antitrust regulators in approving the News-Hughes
combination. 166 Where monopolistic combinations enhance "economic
efficiency with respect both to market participants and consumers,"
the worldwide antitrust model calls for targeted structural or
behavioral conditions to ensure the best situation for the
167
consumer.

159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
See Brazil Antitrust, supra note 104.
162.
See Page, supra note 42, at 1126 (CADE's conditions imposed "huge
additional costs on Colgate" while also requiring the consumer to "incur additional
search costs in order to find the brand they prefer."). For further analysis see page 13 of
this note.
163.
See Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 74, at 814 (CADE's reliance on the
potential competition doctrine was erroneous here because the statistics indicated "a
substantial competitive threat to the leading brewers from existing competitors.").
164.
See Wheatley, Joint Venture, supra note 99 (CADE ordered AnheuserBusch to raise its stake in Antarctica by $1 billion, which amounted to a "toll to enter
Brazil." The condition did little to help Brazilian consumers.).
165.
See Smith, supra note 134 (citing the modeled price increases that would
result from Nestle's concentration of the market).
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Singham, supra note 105, at 393.
167.
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As will be demonstrated below, the News-Hughes Brazilian
venture will benefit consumers, the Brazilian government, and News
alike. Therefore, CADE should approve the merger, conditioned on
News' maintaining behavioral practices that will ensure a benefit to
Brazilian satellite television consumers. CADE should not follow the
precedents of its toothpaste and beer decisions or employ conditions
that raise costs for consumers or exact a toll on News. Rather, it
should follow closely the FCC's example in the News-Hughes U.S.
merger, by permitting the combination and thus benefiting the
Brazilian consumers and News alike, while also ensuring in the
future that News will not serve its own interests to the detriment of
16 8
consumers.
In addition, CADE must examine the proposed combination in
light of the entire pay-television market, rather than just the satellite
television market. In the "toothpaste decisions," CADE considered the
"relevant market" in making its decision. 169 Following the DOJ's
analysis of the EchoStar-DirecTV proposal, CADE should focus not
only on News' control of the satellite market (which would concededly
be quite great at ninety-five percent) but also on an examination of
the merger in light of the 3.5 million cable television subscribers in
Brazil. 170 As the DOJ highlighted in its EchoStar decision,
competition between satellite and cable providers can serve to
171
mitigate the negative effects of a concentrated satellite market.
Given competition from the cable providers, News would be unable to
raise prices and gouge consumers without restraint.
1. Benefits of the News-Hughes Brazilian Combination
In making its decision regarding the News-Hughes Brazilian
combination, CADE should examine the numerous benefits of the
combination for both the Brazilian consumer and the Brazilian
government. Although the combination will give News ninety-five
percent of the Brazilian satellite market, CADE should not flatly

168.
See News-Hughes Merger, supra note 152 (FCC imposed conditions on
News to offer its cable channels at the same price to cable providers and DirecTV, and
providing for arbitration in disputes between cable and satellite providers); Ahrens,
supra note 19 (FCC imposed condition on News to provide local service to the country's
markets).
169.
Relevant Market, supra note 80.
170.
Sixteen Percent of the Region's Homes Have Cable TV, LATIN AM. TELECOM,
Dec. 1, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Homes Have Cable].
171.
See Mulkern, supra note 17 (U.S. DOJ analyzing the EchoStar-DirecTV
combination in light of the fact that "consumers in rural areas who could not get cable
would only have one option for television service"); see also Beauprez & Hudson, supra
note 148 (noting that consumer choices after the EchoStar-DirecTV merger would be
reduced to two: cable and satellite).
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reject the combination simply because of this result. Rather, CADE
should follow the prevalent worldwide antitrust model and examine
the combination not solely in light of its monopoly characteristics, but
also by examining the economic benefits to consumers, News, and the
government alike. 172 In particular, CADE must realize that News'
control of ninety-five percent of the satellite market will achieve
economies of scale, 173 which in turn will enable News to reduce its
subscription prices without sacrificing its long-term viability in
Brazil. 174 This, in turn, should allow millions of Brazilian consumers
to access satellite television for the first time. Over time, more and
more Brazilians will enjoy the quality reception and programming
associated with Sky Global direct-to-home satellite television. 175
CADE must realize that "[p]ay TV doesn't work unless you have a
176
monopoly or dominant position" in the market.
News' monopolistic control over the Brazilian satellite market
will enable Sky Latin America to save money, 177 reduce subscription
prices without sacrificing its long-term viability in Brazil, and
increase subscriptions to its service. 178 In the current market, where
providers compete for the current 1.2 million Brazilian satellite
customers 179 and an additional 3.5 million cable subscribers, 8 0 both
satellite companies are failing, making cutting costs particularly
important for the long-term success of both companies.' 8 ' In Brazil
alone in 2002, Sky Latin America lost $386 million while DirecTV
Latin America lost $202 million.' 8 2 In March 2003, DirecTV Latin
America filed for bankruptcy protection.' 83 These monetary losses
distinguish this situation from Nestle's in the "chocolate decision"
because neither satellite company will be able to expand adequately

172.
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173.
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and provide services to Brazilian consumers under current conditions.
In a country with ten million satellite dishes already installed, the
opportunity exists for News to expand it satellite television
business. 8 4 Antonio Rossa, a partner at Dainet, a media consulting
firm in Sao Paulo, argues, however, that while "it wouldn't be that
difficult to get those people to migrate to pay TV... [the satellite
providers] won't do it charging what they have been charging so
far.' 18 5 "Brazilians consider pay television a luxury[,]" and the
current monthly cost of satellite television, $30, is half the minimum
monthly wage.' 8 6 Therefore, to expand and capture the large
potential market in "a region where people watch a lot of television[,]"
8 7
the satellite providers must reduce prices.'
A price reduction would be possible if CADE permitted News to
combine DirecTV with Sky in Latin America because it could reduce
operating costs. When analyzing the proposed EchoStar-Hughes
combination in the United States, antitrust regulators noted the
advantages of the combination, which included the ability of the two
satellite providers to "combine their satellite fleets and save millions
by beaming down one signal instead of two. ''i 8 8 Those savings could
be passed on to consumers. 189 Moreover, experts expect the Brazilian
merger to increase Sky's value from $420 million to $900 million in
twelve months. 190 Over time, as News is able to become more efficient
absent a significant competitor, it will be able to reduce costs and
prices further in order to increase the number of subscribers. CADE
should place some faith in free markets and rely on News to decrease
prices out of a self-interested need to increase subscription numbers
for its long-term economic health.
CADE should also recognize that Sky satellite television benefits
consumers immensely. U.S. regulators, in approving the NewsHughes deal, recognized the benefits consumers gain from News
operated satellite television: additional channels, features such as
interactivity, and rigorous competition with cable operators. 19 1
Connecting Brazil to a global satellite service that spreads across
nearly every continent 192 will give Brazilian consumers access to
more programming, the ability to watch their favorite national soccer
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185.
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stars on the European club teams, 193 improved exposure to national
and international news, and provide them with a sense of inclusion in
the international community.
Furthermore, connecting its citizens to the world through a
global television network would assist the Brazilian government in
promoting capitalism and becoming a major player on the
international stage. 194 To become a capitalist power, a country must
"improve the performance in industry sectors that constitute the
commercial infrastructure of a vibrant market system.'' 195 One of
"[tihe most important of these sectors [is] communications." 196 By
allowing News to have a monopoly of the satellite television industry
and by trusting that News will provide the best television services
possible out of a desire for long-term financial viability, the Brazilian
government can ensure that consumers receive better television
service, thereby improving its commercial infrastructure through the
communications sector.
Approving the combination would also benefit the Brazilian
government by demonstrating its desire to work with, not against,
the world community. If CADE rejects the News-Hughes combination
while maintaining its sovereignty in antitrust, it may eviscerate the
efficient result of the international combination involving an
international conglomerate. 197 If Brazil acts to block an aspect of the
News-Hughes combination, it may create "negative externalities in
the form of unneeded transaction costs and [a] subsequent
international business stalemate" for News. 19 8 "These transaction
costs manifest themselves in other companies' hesitance to enter into
similar transaction[s] in the future" in Brazil. 199 As a result, "global
Pareto efficiency is lost. ' 200 Although CADE certainly has a legal
authority to assert itself in this matter and prevent the merger, it
must be aware that its decision to do so will affect the efficiency of the

193.
Soma & Weingarten, supra note 2, at 77 (British Sky Broadcasting has
exclusive live broadcast rights to all Premier Football League matches in the United
Kingdom. News also has a multi-year contract with the National Football League. It
also owns rights to broadcast games of seventy professional U.S. sports teams in the
National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball,
as well as numerous collegiate teams.).
194.
See William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust
Controls on Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075, 1110
(Summer 1998) (arguing that developing the infrastructure of the communications
sector is essential for a capitalistic economy).
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Soma & Weingarten, supra note 2, at 102 (arguing that "while China
maintains its sovereignty in antitrust, the efficient result disappears").
198.
Id. at 103.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
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combination throughout the world, particularly in the United States,
which the primary area in which News to expand its satellite
2 01
network.
Finally, a rejection of the combination, especially on the heels of
the "chocolate decision," may send the dangerous signal to the
international community that Brazil is unfriendly to foreign
investment. CADE must be aware that if it continues to act as it did
in the "beer decisions" by enacting a "toll to enter Brazil[,] '20 2
multinationals might stop investing in Brazil, which would impede
the country's goal of becoming a capitalist power. 20 3 Although some
analysts do not believe that multinationals will stop investing in
Brazil, they at least worry that CADE's behavior may cause problems
for other proposed joint ventures that would benefit the Brazilian
2
economy. 04
2. Concerns About the News-Hughes Brazilian Combination
Although a merger between Sky and DirecTV would have
numerous benefits in Brazil, an analysis would be incomplete without
recognizing the competitive problems associated with giving Rupert
Murdoch's News a ninety-five percent control of the satellite
television market. Although News may in the short term keep prices
low to increase subscription rates, the possibility exists that without
placing limits on News' behavior it may increase prices and gouge
consumers in the long run after it eliminates its cable and satellite
competitors. Specifically, CADE should be concerned with the
dangers associated with concentration in an industry in which the
barriers to entry are high, News controls much copyrighted material,
and one viewpoint may monopolize the marketplace of ideas. Such
concerns would only be exacerbated if News accomplishes its objective
of increasing subscription numbers.
In the "toothpaste decision," CADE concluded that the barriers
to entry into the toothpaste market were quite low, which would help
keep Colgate's prices at reasonable levels. 20 5 In contrast, here CADE
should be concerned with very high barriers to entry in the satellite
market. 206 The largest costs to a satellite provider are associated with
establishing service to the network area. 20 7 Licensing costs are high
because of the limited number of broadcast windows and the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

CHENOWETH, supra note 1, at 9.
Wheatley, Venture Approved, supra note 117.
Brazil Antitrust, supra note 104.
Dyer, supra note 72.
Page, supra note 42, at 1125.
Soma & Weingarten, supra note 2, at 57.
Id.
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transactions
costs
associated
with
negotiating
with
the
government. 20 8 In addition, satellite access to a region, "whether
granted via an existing satellite or a new dedicated satellite, is also a
large start-up cost. ' 20 9 With high barriers to entry, new competitors
are unlikely to emerge, and News, regardless of its need to keep
prices low in the short run to increase subscription numbers, may
potentially be free to raise prices in the long run.
Sky Global's worldwide success resulted not just from the
construction of the satellite infrastructure but also from News' control
of copyrighted material. 2 10 Through its control of Twentieth Century
Fox, Fox Broadcasting, and Fox Sports in the United States, 2 11 cable
channels Canal Fox, Fox Kids Latin America, and Fox Sports
Americas in Brazil, 2 12 and its licensing agreements with the National
Football League and the British Premier Football League, 213 News
owns and provides substantial content for its satellite network. This
content has been essential in getting subscribers for Sky Global
networks. 214 Control over so much copyrighted material, however,
may enable News (if it obtains a monopoly in Brazil) to obtain further
dominance by either not allowing competitors to show its content or
by charging its competitors a higher price to do so. These possibilities
concerned U.S. antitrust regulators in the News-Hughes combination
and prompted the FCC to condition approval of the combination upon
News' agreeing to offer its content to cable channels at the same price
2 15
it offers it to its own satellite broadcaster.
Some antitrust analysts favor an "antitrust-plus" analysis for
media mergers. 216 When mergers involve companies whose business
is primarily to communicate ideas, "there is more at stake than high
prices or low quality to consumers-there is a more fundamental
' 217
issue of avoiding control over access to the marketplace of ideas.
This idea, however, "is out of favor among many who would rely more
on economic efficiency to the exclusion of diversity or political
considerations in making an antitrust evaluation, particularly

208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
See id. at 45 ("The News Corporation network, given its control over key
copyrighted content, makes the development of a competing network extremely
unlikely.").
211.
Id. at 69.
212.
Id. at 72.
213.
Id. at 77.
214.
See id. at 79 (Content and sports broadcasting "is very much the key to
unlocking the door to the efficiencies of scale that the network brings.").
215.
News-Hughes Merger, supra note 152.
216.
Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging and
Emerging Media, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1009, 1019 (Summer 1996).
217.
Id. (quoting Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
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considering scale efficiencies that larger enterprises . . . typically

generate." 218 Although a provider may "not always be responsible" if
it has a large market share, 219 and News certainly has been accused
of having a right-wing bias, 220 "it is difficult to predict that large
owners vis-A-vis small ones are more inclined towards antidemocratic
values ....

If anything, large, publicly-held companies, who face the

shareholder version of democracy and an array of.
'2 21
be less inclined to veer far from the middle."

.

. regulators, may

3. Recommendation: Conditional Approval
In making antitrust decisions, the DOJ and CADE have both
used the "increasingly popular type of merger enforcement
decision"-namely, conditional approval. 222 In the "toothpaste
decision" and "beer decisions" in Brazil, as well as in the approval of
the News-Hughes combination in the United States, regulators have
placed conditions, both structural and behavioral, upon approval. 223 A
structural condition is "where one of the merging parties divests
certain assets in order to prevent harm to competition. ' 22 4 These
types of conditions have been imposed in the beer and toothpaste
decisions in that the monopolistic entity was required to invest in
competitors or to invest more in the acquired company. 225 A
behavioral condition calls for the new enterprise to "promise to
behave in a certain way in the future .

.

. accept[ing] the existence of

the competitive problem but seek[ing] assurances that the merged
firm will not behave anticompetitively. '' 226 Such behavioral conditions
require "future monitoring and enforcement by the competition
tribunal" 227 and have been imposed in the U.S. News-Hughes
decision, as well as in the "toothpaste" and "beer" decisions in

218.
Id. at 1019.
219.
Id. at 1033.
220.
Rupert Murdoch and his media outlets are generally recognized as being
politically right-of-center. The New York Post and Fox News Channel are two prime
examples. See Ken Auletta, VOX FOX; How Roger Ailes and Fox News are Changing
Cable News, NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003 (discussing News' Fox News Channel and its
right-of-center perspective).
221.
Brenner, supra note 216, at 1033-34.
222.
Pittman, supra note 110, at 268.
223.
See supra Part III.
224.
Pittman, supra note 110, at 269.
225.
See Page, supra note 42, at 1125 (CADE forced Colgate to stop selling the
Kolynos brand for four years to give competitors a chance to establish themselves, to
sell toothpaste in Brazil under a new "alternative" brand, and to sell twenty percent of
its stock of toothpaste to third parties for resale under their own brands.).
226.
Pittman, supra note 110, at 269.
227.
Id.

2004]

OLD MAN AND THE SKY

Brazil. 228 While structural remedies are typically preferable to
behavioral remedies because they "attack the root of the problem and
do not require long-term monitoring to assure their effectiveness," in
certain situations, such as the News-Hughes Brazilian combination,
behavioral conditions are more useful. CADE should approve the
News-Hughes combination, conditioned upon certain behavioral
requirements, namely commitment not to engage in price
discrimination against competitors for content it owns, and a
commitment to localism (i.e., airing local broadcast channels on its
satellite network).
First, similar to the conditions imposed by the FCC on the NewsHughes combination, CADE should condition its approval upon News'
commitment not to engage in price discrimination against
competitors for content. To this end, CADE should require News to
offer its Brazilian and U.S. copyrighted content to its competitors,
both satellite (Tecsat) and cable providers, at the same price at which
it offers them to Sky Latin America. 229 Since News controls much
copyrighted content through its ownership of Brazilian and U.S. cable
channels, 230 the threat exists that News may charge its competitors
exorbitant licensing rates to gain access to such content, thereby
using its monopoly position to gain a serious competitive edge. The
benefit to Brazilian consumers from News' virtual monopoly relies on
News' need to lower subscription prices for Sky in order to increase
subscription numbers. 23 ' Were News to charge Tecsat or the cable
operators a higher content rate for access to Canal Fox or pull such
content from their competitors' systems, then News would be simply
running its competitors out of business. Although News would still
have to decrease subscription prices to a slight degree in order to lure
consumers away from free television, it would not need to lower
subscription prices to lure the 3.5 million Brazilian cable television
consumers. Those consumers would pay higher subscription rates
because they desire News' programming, like Canal Fox, and would
2 32
have no alternative to Sky for such access.
Also, Brazilian consumers would benefit from a condition
whereby all programming disputes between cable and satellite
providers would be settled by arbitration. 233 Taking guidance from

228.
See supra Part III.
229.
See News-Hughes Merger, supra note 152 (FCC required News to offer its
cable channels to cable providers at which the same price as it offers them to DirecTV.).
230.
Soma & Weingarten, supra note 2, at 66, 72.
231
This analysis is developed in detail on pages 19-23.
232.
See Ahrens, supra note 19 ("FCC studies show that pulling [channels] from
cable systems drives customers to satellite services faster than any other factor.").
233.
See News-Hughes Merger, supra note 152 (FCC required News to enter into
arbitration resolution for disputes with cable providers over programming).
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the FCC decision on the News-Hughes combination, this condition
would benefit consumers by ensuring that any disputes would be
resolved rather than dragged out through private negotiations that
often result in interruptions of service. 234 An inefficient system with
service interruptions risks causing price increases as the negotiation
costs of satellite and cable providers increase. 23 5 Furthermore, the
arbitration system would "prevent News Corp. from threatening to
pull its popular [broadcasting channels] from rival cable systems to
'23 6
extract higher payments.
Second, also in light of the FCC News-Hughes decision, CADE
should condition approval upon a commitment by News to promote
localism. 237 CADE should require News to carry Brazil's seven free
broadcast channels on the Sky satellite system. This condition would
promote an efficient result because consumers who switch to satellite
service would not be required to keep their antennas or have multiinput television sets whereby they could switch between satellite and
free television. By carrying the local broadcasters on the satellite
system, Sky would provide clear and crisp reception not only of
stations new and interesting to Brazilian consumers, but also of the
stations Brazilians are used to viewing. Such a behavioral condition
would further ensure that Brazilian consumers benefit from the
News-Hughes combination.
Finally, CADE should not impose a "benchmark pricing"
condition on News whereby News would agree to a ceiling for the
price it charges its customers. 238 While CADE could mandate to News
that it can only offer Sky service for as much as "$X" per month, such
a condition would be both impractical and ineffective. First, for News
to become viable in the long run, which will in turn benefit Brazilian
consumers, it must have some flexibility to lower prices at the

234.
See id.; see also Paul Tharp, EchoStar, Viacom Say Truce is in Works, N.Y.
POST, Mar. 11, 2004, at 33 (An example of such inefficiency can be seen recently as
EchoStar and program provider Viacom were in a dispute over how to split the $3
monthly hike paid by EchoStar consumers as well as EchoStar's refusal to accept all of
Viacom's bundled cable network programming in order to gain retransmission rights to
all of CBS' stations. As a result, Viacom's programming was blacked out on EchoStar
service in millions of homes for two days, causing as many as 2,000 EchoStar
subscribers to switch to competing cable companies).
235.
See News-Hughes Merger, supranote 152 (FCC required News to enter into
arbitration resolution for disputes with cable providers over programming).
236.
Ahrens, supra note 19.
237.
See id. (FCC requires News to "beam local channels into 100 of the nation's
markets by the end of [2004] and to provide local service to the rest of the country's 210
markets no later than 2008" in order to comply with the agency's goal of localism).
238.
See id. In the News-Hughes ruling "[tihe FCC had considered imposing a
'benchmark pricing' condition on News Corp., but found the contracts regarding
regional sports programming too complex and feared that hard benchmarks could
eventually be maneuvered around."
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moment when it best fits into News' business plan. Any forced
reduction would hurt News' viability, which would damage any
chance for consumers to benefit from the combination. Second, any
such benchmarks may easily be maneuvered around in the long run,
239
If
which makes imposing them impractical and wasteful.
benchmarks are imposed and several years later News goes to CADE
240
It
and argues that "conditions have changed," what is CADE to do?
is better to allow the market to permit News to correct its prices as
necessary. Third, competition watchdogs in developing countries, like
Brazil, lack "the resources to devote to long-term regulation of
'24 1
particular sectors of the economy."
Fourth, for Brazil to truly develop a powerful capitalist economy,
it must to some degree have faith in free markets. It must rely on
News not to gouge consumers because doing so would reduce
subscription numbers, which would prevent News from becoming
economically viable. While "the implementation of antitrust policy
can provide actual or symbolic assurance to the public and its elected
officials that the move to a market system does not leave citizens at
the mercy of the market," 242 antitrust policy "does not and should not
protect the citizen from the market, except in the narrow sense of
preserving competition. If the expectation is that antitrust is
somehow a substitute for state dictation of 'fair' market outcomes, it
is likely that antitrust will be interpreted in ways that conflict with
'2 43
the goal of establishing a market economy.

V. CONCLUSION

After years of economic failure, Brazil moved away from an
economic system in which the government owned the nation's major
industries to one in which private, profit-seeking companies operated
free of government intrusion. 244 In response to excessive economic
concentration in the hands of private corporations, CADE has
increased its regulatory oversight. 245 When it acted, however, CADE

239.
See id. (FCC believed such benchmarks could be maneuvered around).
240.
See Pittman, supra note 110, at 269 (arguing that benchmark prices are
infeasible because marketplace conditions are ever-changing).
241.
Id.
242.
Manisha M. Sheth, Note, Formulating Antitrust Policy in Emerging
Economies, 86 GEO. L.J. 451, 454-55 (Nov. 1997).
243.
Page, supra note 42, at 1116.
244.
See Oliveira, supra note 43 (arguing that the Brazilian government began
to develop its competition policy to respond to the "social demand for the repression
and prevention of the abuse of economic power, now more concentrated in the hands of
private agents"); Page, supranote 42, at 1119-20.
245.
See supra Part II.A.
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often failed to implement antitrust policies that benefited consumers,
private corporations, and the interests of the Brazilian government
alike. 246 With the combination of Brazil's two largest direct-to-home
satellite television services, CADE has an opportunity to act in a way
consistent with its mission by allowing for the development of Brazil's
communications
infrastructure, while simultaneously helping
consumers gain access to a service with in the global community.
By conditionally approving the News-Hughes
Brazilian
combination, CADE can ensure that Brazilian consumers enjoy the
benefits associated with satellite television.2 47 By approving the
merger, CADE would allow for Sky Latin America to become a viable
participant in the Brazilian television market, enabling it to compete
with cable television and free-television. Through the merger, Sky
will be able to cut costs, enabling it to offer its satellite television
services at a lower price, which will in turn increase subscription
numbers because more Brazilians will be capable of affording Sky's
services. Consumers will have more programming options, an
increased ability to access the same information as consumers in
other parts of the world, and a chance to save money when
purchasing pay television (a luxury item in Brazil). Furthermore,
Brazil can demonstrate its desire to attract foreign investment and
international capitalism.
CADE can quell its concerns over the merger by demanding that
News comply with certain behavioral conditions. 248 First, News
should be prohibited from engaging in price discrimination and be
required to sell its own content to other cable and satellite providers
at the same cost as it does to Sky. CADE's approval should include a
provision directing any programming dispute to an independent
arbitrator. Second, News should also be required to carry local
programming on Sky. Finally, in order to truly benefit consumers
without hurting News, CADE should not enforce "benchmark
pricing," which would be an ineffective and inefficient way of keeping
prices low.
CADE and the Brazilian government should not fall prey to fears
and concerns about capitalism or concerns about a concentration in
the satellite industry by following their instincts to over-regulate.
Although regulation is necessary in certain situations to maintain a
competitive market, in situations where consumers benefit from the
concentration, as in the News-Hughes combination, regulators must
resist their inclination to over-regulate. CADE and Brazil should put
their faith in capitalism, which should see News' desire for

246.
247.
248.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.D. 1.
See supra Part IV.D.3.
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profitability in Brazil lead to a reduction in prices, thus benefiting the
millions of Brazilians seeking a premium satellite television service.*
Geoffrey Drake**
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